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ABSTRACT
With Electronic Warfare joining the Cyber Branch in October 2018, numerous opportunities and challenges that affect warfighters are surfacing. To capture and consolidate some of these observations, the Electronic Warfare Cyber Convergence (EWC2) workshop, held in conjunction with the 2018 
Cyberspace Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA) conference, provided an opportunity for 
experts from military, government, commercial and academic backgrounds to compare 
insights, explore friction points, consider deeper issues and note potential research 
opportunities within the EWC2. In this workshop, participants learned that the 
convergence of EW and cyberspace operations is only the initial step towards the greater 
goal of controlling information on the battlefield.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On October 1, 2018, the United States Army merged its electronic warfare (EW) functional 
area into its Cyber Branch. This merger supports the Army’s doctrinal requirement to perform 
cyberspace and EW operations in support of unified land operations and joint operations.[1] 
As with any merger, however, friction points involving culture, policy, doctrine, operations, 
and technology can create obstacles to achieving a cohesive organization. To address these 
challenges, the U.S. Army must identify and address the merger’s shortfalls across doctrine, 
organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy 
(DOTMLPF-P). The desire to address these shortfalls was at the forefront of the inaugural 
Electronic Warfare Cyber Convergence (EWC2) Workshop, which was organized and mod-
erated by the Army Cyber Institute (ACI) and industry volunteers in collaboration with the 
Program Executive Office for Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Sensors (PEO IEW&S), 
Communications-Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center (CERDEC),[2] 
and the Association of Old Crows (AOC). 
During the workshop’s two-day event, leaders, operators, and researchers across military 
services, defense agencies, and civilian organizations discussed, debated, and identified friction 
points, hurdles, and ways forward within the converging EW and Cyber communities. 
Workshop focus areas included innovative research, training, and opportunities to advance 
and support CEMA.[3] Participants also explored how to leverage this convergence to allow 
commanders to outmaneuver adversaries, both physically and cognitively, in multi-domain bat-
tle. Products of this event included a consolidated set of friction points and challenges facing EW 
and Cyber convergence along with suggestions and opportunities for enabling friendly forces to 
operate effectively in the current and future battlefield. Moreover, participants focused on how 
to seamlessly achieve these goals for warfighters who ultimately care about how cyberspace and 
EW operations will enable them to gain dominance in multi-domain battle and win.
The topics of this workshop evolved from a discussion of friction points that were created 
with the convergence of EW and Cyber. The ACI encouraged exploration of operational and 
personnel gaps; and the link between EW and cyberspace operations and information oper-
ations (IO). Technological challenges discussed at TechNet 2018 contributed to the selection 
of machine learning (ML) and artificial intelligence (AI) as enablers for cyberspace and EW 
operations. These topics led to the workshop’s five focused areas: 1) general friction points of 
EW/Cyber convergence; 2) employment of EW/Cyber personnel; 3) operational employment 
of EW/Cyber capabilities; 4) employment of AI/ML in cyberspace and EW operations; and 5) 
leveraging CEMA for IO. Each participant was assigned two topic areas based on experience, 
expertise, and interest. Participants rotated between focus areas on both days of the 
workshop. As a result, the participants generated vibrant discussions on directions, trends, 
and challenges of EW/Cyber convergence and were challenged to develop questions about 
gaps, friction points, and research opportunities for each of these topics. These discussions 
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also led participants to acknowledge that greater convergence is yet to come as more areas of 
expertise fall under information warfare operations. This report summarizes the workshop’s 
outcomes, which will ideally serve to drive future discussions by leadership and researchers 
to close gaps, smooth friction points (perceived or not), and pursue research opportunities to 
improve cyberspace and EW operations.
II. BACKGROUND
Before convergence, EW and Cyber communities were largely separated and widely varied 
across the military services in terms of equipment, unit organization, operational tasks, and 
culture. Meanwhile, near-peer adversaries have demonstrated integrated EW and cyberspace 
capabilities along with Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Information Operations (IO) capabil-
ities in real-world operations. Russia’s use of EW/Cyber/SIGINT/IO[4] during its conflict with 
Ukraine, and in Syria, proved particularly illuminating—indicating future conflicts will require 
kinetic and non-kinetic maneuver, both physically and cognitively, across multiple domains.[5] 
For instance, adversaries may attempt to strike at homeland installations via kinetic and 
non-kinetic means to disrupt or delay deployment of forces, manipulate national commitment 
to potential or ongoing conflicts, or disrupt the warfighting functions of deployed units.
We now expect our enemies to employ cyberspace attack capabilities (such as disruptive and 
destructive malware); EW capabilities (jamming and signal geolocation), and space capabilities 
that obstruct satellite use to disrupt U.S. military communications; positioning, navigation, 
and timing (PNT); synchronization; and freedom of maneuver. These threats make it clear—if 
the U.S. military is to succeed in this future battlespace, it must gain combat superiority over 
its adversaries by defending its information networks in cyberspace and securing unimpeded 
access to the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) while denying its adversaries the ability to do 
the same.
These concerns are driving the Army to challenge the way it employs personnel, conducts 
operations and focuses on technological capabilities. In response, the EWC2 workshop provid-
ed a collaborative environment for participants to discuss, debate, organize and determine the 
friction points, hurdles, and ways forward within the converging EW and Cyber communities. 
During multiple breakout sessions, participants attempted to identify friction points, doctrinal 
gaps, and innovative research needed to advance and support cyberspace and EW operations. 
Hence, the workshop’s outcomes focused on the next stage of technical and non-technical 
objectives needed to enable friendly forces to operate effectively in current and future 
multi-domain battlefields while deterring the adversary’s ability to do the same.
III. GENERAL EW/CYBER FRICTION POINTS 
Mergers frequently struggle with a clash of personalities, cultures, priorities, and leader-
ship that creates points of friction or resistance to a unified application of effort. For instance, 
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during the workshop, one participant expressed concern that there is a potential for the Army’s 
EW/Cyber convergence campaign to erode the fundamental understanding that cyberspace 
operations and EW operations are at their core separate and distinct capabilities with unique 
pros and cons. For instance, EW seeks to preserve the EMS for friendly use while denying its use 
to the enemy. Subdivisions of EW include electronic attack (EA), EW support (ES), and electronic 
defense (ED)[6] Cyberspace operations (CO) include offensive cyberspace operations (OCO), 
defensive cyberspace operations (DCO), and DoD information network (DODIN) operations. 
Cyberspace operations employ cyberspace capabilities with the primary purpose of achieving 
objectives in or through cyberspace,[7] which admittedly depends on the EMS at the physical 
communication layer. However, these two capabilities have different focuses, requiring different 
high-demand, low-density skill sets. 
By merging EW and cyberspace capabilities, the U.S. Army hopes to achieve better 
coordination across the EMS and cyberspace to gain advantage over its adversaries. The 
potential to dilute skills and training resources that are already inherent in EW and cyberspace 
workforces does exist. In 2016, Sen# stated that the convergence of Cyber and EW would 
further degrade the already limited resources allocated for EW.[8] He argued that EW is only 
used in the continuum of military operations during Phase 2, “Seize the Initiative,” while 
cyberspace capabilities are employed during all phases of military operations causing it to 
receive more attention and resources. Arguably, EW has a role during other phases, but Sen-
#’s point raises a valid concern that resourcing remains an issue across training, equipping, 
and staffing. Hence, participants asked how the Army can better allocate resources without 
further constraining EW capabilities?
Participants noted that current friction points mostly reside in the acquisition, 
policy/authorities, classification boundaries, and force structure. Much work is needed to 
balance requirements with system acquisition processes to ensure better vendor engagement. 
Policy/authorities were the most contentious of the friction points listed above. The majority 
of working group members view policy/authorities as a hindrance to mission accomplish-
ment. However, working group members noted that it is not necessarily policies per se, that 
are the problem, but rather the interpretation of the policies at the strategic and operational 
level that falls short. This happens when there is a lack of technical understanding required 
to accurately and quickly validate a tactical course of action (COA). Maturing of the force and 
additional training for personnel working at the strategic and operational level will help in 
this regard. From a classification standpoint, participants expressed frustration at the lack 
of cross-domain solutions available for sharing operationally relevant data with warfighters. 
If commanders and staff are to gain the advantage over adversaries in multi-domain battle, 
the Army must pursue a national-level forcing function to ensure they receive relevant in-
formation promptly. 
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IV. EMPLOYMENT OF EW/CYBER PERSONNEL
The Army has taken great strides towards increasing its capability to conduct EW and cyber-
space operations. The initial focus was on staff-level manning with the creation of the CEMA 
sections as the staff focal point for planning, integration, and synchronization of EW and 
cyberspace operations. These staff elements are expected to be organic at each echelon from 
the Brigade headquarters to Theater Army, and they are staffed with existing EW and Spectrum 
Management Officer (SMO) personnel, plus some limited new personnel authorizations. 
Unfortunately, these members have received limited or no training on their new requirements. 
Moreover, the lack of EW equipment resulted in limited training on the actual conduct of EW 
operations. Similar SMO training primarily focuses on the administrative tasks of spectrum 
planning and deconfliction rather than spectrum maneuver. As a result, a major overhaul 
of training is required to enable the CEMA section to perform as designed. CEMA Section 
personnel need to be experts in EW systems with a strong grasp of existing cyberspace capa-
bilities. Additionally, SMO personnel must be trained to advise the CEMA section on the best 
employment of its assigned capabilities based on the EMS and physical terrain aspects of the 
operating environment and to help mitigate the unintended effects of employed systems. In 
addition to individual and collective training at the tactical level, the CEMA section also 
requires classified intelligence and reach-back support to EW and cyberspace subject matter 
experts to help it address emerging threats in a rapidly changing environment. This reach-back 
support would help fill training and expertise gaps and could potentially be offered by future 
formations such as the recently approved Cyber Warfare Support Battalion (CWSB). 
The CEMA section also struggles with limited intelligence support. As the Army grows its 
EW and cyberspace forces, there has been little or no corresponding growth in the support-
ing intelligence formations. EW and cyberspace operations require specialized technical and 
timely intelligence as well as the analysis and characterization of collected signals. There is 
significant work required to shape future operating environments through detailed intelligence 
preparation of the battlefield (IPB). IPB to support EW and cyberspace operations requires 
that the electromagnetic and cyberspace environment be baselined along with capabilities 
to support situational understanding. Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) surveys are required to 
identify and characterize signals of interest and develop signatures before a conflict to enable 
EW systems to rapidly identify and target signal and associated adversary units in the opening 
phases of future conflicts. Current intelligence forces have already struggled to meet exist-
ing intelligence requirements before the surge in EW and cyberspace forces and capabilities. 
The Army will need to expand its intelligence operations in Phase 0 to gather the necessary 
intelligence and information to enable emerging EW and cyberspace capabilities. In an era of 
limited resources and numerous critical gaps across the Army, any increase in intelligence 
capability has not been a high enough priority to be resourced.
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To further exacerbate the lack of intelligence, and due to the cross-domain deficiency 
discussed in the previousection, CEMA sections struggle to receive and share SIGINT and 
other highly classified information with other associated intelligence elements. The CEMA 
section, like the rest of their associated headquarters, operates on SECRET networks while 
their much-needed intelligence support, such as SIGINT, is resident on TOP SECRET networks. 
CEMA personnel are not currently mandated to receive the level of clearance necessary to 
receive and work with this information. To integrate with the Mission Command systems on 
SIPR, current and future EW systems are only required to operate at the SECRET level, which 
places policy and technological barriers that degrade the effectiveness of current and future 
capabilities. The lack of cross-domain solutions further exacerbates the exchange of needed 
information. 
The CEMA Cell of the future may also look different than today. The function may end up 
absorbed into another staff element such as the fires section or a future information warfare 
section. Regardless of any potential reorganization, the requirements to understand and inte-
grate EW and cyberspace capabilities into operations will remain. The CEMA Cell of the future 
will have to overcome current issues with sharing classified intelligence with the CEMA Cell 
being able to access TOP SECRET information needed to plan, integrate, and synchronize EW 
and cyberspace effects. A fused picture that integrates not only EW and cyberspace informa-
tion, but also SIGINT, Space, and IO reflecting the latest information and intelligence, must be 
available to our planners. This capability may look more like the design for the coming Intel-
ligence Cyberspace Electronic Warfare Space (ICEWS) detachment that is a part of the future 
Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF). The Army has already identified requirements to invest 
in a common operating environment (COE) with its command post computing environment 
(CPCE) that attempts to address these challenges. However, these programs are only in their 
nascent stages, and much work and research are needed to bring the analytics and tools to bear 
that will provide commanders and staff with situational understanding. Future CEMA sections 
must also be experts in utilizing assigned sensors (EW, Cyberspace, Space, and intelligence), 
intelligence resources, open source information, and battlefield innovation to see and under-
stand their operating environment and to conduct planning to integrate EW and cyberspace 
capabilities into every operation to provide targeting options and defend their unit’s networks 
and systems. These capabilities should be the basis of collective training for the CEMA section. 
Evolving EW Platoons and Training
As EW platoons are fielded with equipment and capabilities, it becomes critically important 
to establish common training standards. Like other specialties, the EW Platoons should have 
both collective and individual task standards that will allow their leaders to establish training 
plans and determine their unit’s readiness for its wartime mission. Today, units are using their 
initiative to establish their tasks and standards. These tasks and standards need to be passed 
to Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), so they can be normalized and codified into 
Army tasks and standards. These tasks and standards should be maintained, with the advice 
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and consent of Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER) as the operational headquarters for all EW 
and cyberspace forces in the Army, at the Cyber Center of Excellence, an arm of TRADOC.
The newly approved EW platoons at the Brigade level (EW Company at Corps echelon) will 
work with sensitive equipment that if used improperly could have adverse effects on U.S. 
Forces, allies, and non-combatants. To ensure that these capabilities are employed correctly, 
each of the operators should be certified on their assigned equipment. As the Army begins to 
operationalize tactical cyberspace operations, these units may receive new capabilities in an 
ad hoc manner. Platoons should look to the mechanized and armor formations and consider 
using a Master Gunner who is responsible for certifying each of the soldiers on their assigned 
equipment. New EW/cyberspace capabilities could then be passed through the Master Gunner 
who would assume responsibility for training the rest of the operators in the platoon. Hence, 
the Master Gunner would require extensive training both as a cyberspace operator and EW 
expert. This role is ideally suited for a warrant officer. 
In the EW and Cyberspace mission areas, warrant officers are the technical subject matter 
experts, and they have a training and development track to enable them to fill this role. This 
makes the warrant officer a key participant of CEMA sections at all echelons as integral to 
advising the CEMA chief and the commander on the capability and employment of assigned 
systems. Despite the recognition of their key role, participants noted that warrant officers were 
le# off the EW Platoon’s force design. This gap potentially leaves a critical vulnerability in our 
forward most units of action.
METs and Readiness
In the Army, a unit’s readiness is directly linked to its mission essential tasks (METs). These 
tasks are the priority for unit training and are typically tracked by commanders. For EW and 
cyberspace operations to receive the necessary training support, their associated tasks must 
be included in (or directly influence) the accomplishment of its MET for maneuver formations 
from battalion to division level. METs are critical as they affect the Objective Task evaluation 
of a unit’s readiness to accomplish its wartime mission. Without this emphasis, unit’s will not 
assign EW and cyberspace operations training the priority required to match peer adversaries. 
Emphasis on the importance of EW and cyberspace training must be top-down and heavi-
ly integrated. The U.S. Army’s Cyber Directorate in the Army G3/5/7 (Operations, Planning 
and Training section), DAMO-CY, is responsible for developing the Army EW and cyberspace 
strategy and is uniquely able to orchestrate the integration of all aspects of the man, train, 
and equip mission into Army foundational documents that will ultimately drive requirements, 
resourcing, and prioritization. Guidance from these strategies will be amplified through other 
foundational Army training documents such as the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) 
Training Guidance. This guidance is published annually and serves as the basis from which all 
Army units develop their priorities for training. The continued requirement to address CEMA 
in annual training guidance would influence commanders to increase their priority for EW and 
cyberspace training. 
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Army exercises also provide an opportunity to increase training emphasis for EW and 
cyberspace operations. Combat Training Centers have been used to exercise limited EW and 
Cyberspace capabilities. Unfortunately, these tasks have not been prioritized as critical tasks. 
When used, Opposing Force (OPFOR) capabilities have seen limited or constrained use due to 
concerns that it will degrade the unit’s networks or systems to the point that it is prevented 
from achieving its training objectives. Also, EW and cyberspace topics are rarely—if ever—topics 
of conversation in the commander’s end-of-rotation A#er Action Reviews (AAR). Instead, it is 
relegated to other AARs not typically attended by commanders. To increase the visibility and 
importance of EW and cyberspace in the eyes of commanders, the Division Trainer—who is 
responsible for shaping a Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation—can state that EW and cyber-
space operations will be a primary objective for the rotation, which would ensure the rotational 
Commander’s attention and their inclusion in mid-and end-of-rotation AARs. Broader employ-
ment of OPFOR EW and cyberspace capabilities would also demonstrate a more realistic threat 
picture and would likely serve as an eye-opener to how vulnerable forces are to the EW and 
cyberspace threat. All of these taken together would be a powerful message on the increased 
importance of EW and cyberspace operations, especially if the message is tied to maneuver. 
Cyber and EW communities have primarily addressed cyberspace and EW operations as 
technical issues, not operational ones. However, to best address the U.S. military’s personnel, 
equipment, and training challenges, a different perspective is needed. Instead of viewing 
operations through the lens of cyberspace and EW (or even Intelligence, Mission Command, 
or Fires), leaders need to consider these capabilities through the lens of the maneuver 
commander. This viewpoint will enable changes in how the U.S. Army approaches these 
challenges, and it will allow warfighters to effectively integrate cyberspace and EW capabil-
ities into military operations—helping warfighters visualize, describe, and direct operations 
in the EMS and cyberspace.[9]
Recruiting and Retention
The emerging technological advances in EW and cyberspace capabilities require a more 
technically-skilled Soldier. The Army has begun to address this challenge through assessing 
and adjusting basic test scores to qualify Soldiers for these more technical military occupation 
skills. One challenge is that the type of individuals that are required to perform these missions 
are inherently sought a#er in the public workplace, and their value and job opportunities 
only increase as they receive advanced training in the service. These facts create challenges 
for recruiting and retaining these soldiers. Several ideas such as monetary bonuses, 
advanced schooling, assignment stability, and flexible standards on physical fitness and uniform 
requirements were discussed. While monetary bonuses can help to recruit initial personnel 
and early bonuses tied to utilization tours could help keep them longer, it is hard for the mili-
tary to compete with salaries offered in the corporate workplace. 
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While flexible standards on physical fitness, uniform, and other military standards may 
sound good at face value, the opinion of the working group was that anything that undermines 
the military’s discipline and sense of mission, which creates camaraderie within the service 
would do more harm than good by retaining the wrong type of personnel. Similarly, personnel 
solely motivated by monetary inducements may not have the right motivations necessary to 
integrate into Army formations successfully. Working group participants suggested that the 
best personnel are the ones that share the sense of mission and purpose. Furthermore, bene-
fits that help personnel perform their jobs better, such as longer assignment periods, advanced 
schooling, and the ability to focus and professionalize in specific mission areas are options 
worth pursuing. However, this is an area deserving of greater investigation and analysis. 
Officer Development
In the new design for EW platoons, a Career Mission Field (CMF) 17 (Cyberspace Warfare) 
Second Lieutenant is the platoon leader. EWC2 participants questioned whether newly com-
missioned officers are the ideal candidate for the role. A#er all, the EW Platoon is a Brigade, 
not a company, asset. Are lieutenants expected to possess the technical savvy and operational 
understanding needed to facilitate the employment of EW capabilities? Like other mission ar-
eas, lieutenants will likely be responsible for the leadership and operational employment of 
their platoons and will lean on their non-commissioned officers (NCO) and a warrant officer (if 
included in the future force design) for technical advice. These officers will receive the same 
training as an officer destined for service within the Cyber Mission Forces (CMF), but with 
additional training of EW. 
Participants asked whether these officers would benefit from more diversified career paths 
that include time leading in tactical as well as operational and strategic units. Officers who 
serve in tactical roles can serve as ambassadors able to translate the highly technical aspects 
of EW and cyberspace operations into maneuver language that resonates with battlefield 
commanders. This position also affects the broader Army’s perception of EW and cyberspace 
forces as platoon leaders will serve as the primary point of contact to U.S. military leaders. An 
argument can also be made that these officers should be the best of the CMF 17 to assist in the 
adoption and integration of this emerging capability. 
V. OPERATIONAL EMPLOYMENT OF EW/CYBER CAPABILITIES
The operational employment of EW/Cyberspace capabilities touched upon intelligence, 
doctrine, and understanding of capabilities. These gaps stretch across how warfighters receive 
cross-domain intelligence, apply cyber/EW capabilities and understand the impact of cyber-
space and EW operations on their warfighting functions. For instance, there is a gap in the 
timeliness in which actionable intelligence is extracted from classified sources and shared 
with warfighters. Participants identified the need to identify a cross-domain solution that can 
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expedite this process. Understanding the impact of cyberspace and EW operations was also 
identified as a key weakness for commanders and staff. With regard to understanding the 
impacts of cyberspace and EW operations on the battlefield, EWC2 participants observed that 
leaders from Brigade through Division struggle to obtain an adequate understanding of what 
tasks EW and cyberspace operations can perform. They also lack information about what tools/
assets are arrayed to perform these tasks—both within the Army and the broader Joint force. 
In the Army’s Cyber/Electromagnetic Contest Capabilities Based Assessment (C/EW CBA), 
published in 2013, Cyber Situational Awareness [Understanding] was listed as the number one 
gap within its Functional Needs Assessment (FNA) Gaps with Doctrine Aspects.[10] Six years 
later, our research demonstrates this remains a gap in U.S. Army capabilities. 
Participants also identified the lack of tools to create, access, or perform collection and effects 
in support of cyberspace operations as a gap. This discussion developed along two lines. First, 
what tools are already developed and available to support tactical (BCT-DIV) cyber? Second, 
what processes exist (or could be created) to rapidly validate existing open source tools for use? 
The Army has embraced events like Cyber Quest and Cyber Blitz to help answer these 
questions and inform requirements. Major General Morrison (Commanding General, U.S. 
Army Cyber Center of Excellence and Fort Gordon) said as much when he stated that “Cyber 
Quest will concentrate on enabling more rapid technology to aid the soldiers.”[11] Similarly, 
Cyber Blitz is an experimentation campaign supporting the U.S. Army with the timely transi-
tion of innovative Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance 
and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) technical capabilities.[12] However, informing warfighters of the 
results of these events and getting their feedback may still require further progress. These 
events fall short of emulating an actual tactical environment and are not funded or resourced 
except for a fraction of the devices and services found in actual units. These issues represent 
a clear gap in rapidly validating new tools and getting them into the hands of warfighters. 
Resourcing also hinders operator led design. 
Advantages that the U.S. Army have in cyberspace and EW operations are that Soldiers are 
resourceful, and they are capable of innovating in the field, yet, some EWC2 participants stated 
that higher headquarters might be hesitant to allow such innovations without proper validation 
and certification. What is interesting about these questions is that many EWC2 participants 
believe that there is a need for some level of cyberspace and EW operations capability to be 
organic to warfighters at DIV-BCT. This lack of communication or shared vision likely serves as 
a friction point across the Army’s leadership. Perhaps Army leadership should reevaluate what 
capabilities, if any, should be passed down to lower echelons and then educate leadership and 
staff as to why other capabilities are best suited for execution at the Army Service Component 
Command (ASCC) level (i.e., ARCYBER). 
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Some working group (WG) participants also stated they believe there is friction with author-
ity as it applies to training and operations. The perception, whether true or not, is that very 
few leaders, lawyers, and legislators are competent in cyber law, policy and operations. This 
gap potentially prevents requests from being generated and staffed at BCT-DIV. Because of this 
observation, workshop attendees asked what mechanisms exist or could be created to tutor 
senior leaders (COL and above) who are currently in command and staff positions to close their 
education gaps in cyberspace operations and policy. A similar question included legislators: 
what mechanisms exist or could be created to tutor legislators to make more informed policy 
decisions regarding Cyber/EW.
Workshop participants also questioned how many BCT or Special Forces Group (SFG) Judge 
Advocate General (JAG) officers possess the competency to inform a legal brief describing 
whether an internally generated cyber training or operations concept is legal? Perhaps a more 
important question regarding the use of JAG officers is at what point in training/deployment 
preparations should a JAG officer be integrated into the military decision-making process 
(MDMP) for CEMA planning and COA development? If achieved, would integrating the JAG 
officer into the Cyber/EW planning process could also help close individual education gaps of 
commanders and staff about cyberlaw?
VI. EMPLOYMENT OF AI/ML IN EW/CYBER OPERATIONS
To effectively employ EW and cyberspace operations at “machine speed” in future, 
multi-domain operations, workshop participants discussed the incorporation of artificial 
intelligence/machine learning (AI/ML) in future systems. This could help overcome training 
lapses and hasten the response time of U.S. Forces to respond to EW- and cyberspace-based 
attacks. The ability for EW and cyberspace systems to autonomously detect, characterize, 
and respond to signals of interest will be increasingly important to protect against electronic 
attack, to deny signals, or to manipulate signals for exploitation. During TechNet 2018, 
Colonel Steven Rehn, TRADOC Capability Manager (TCM) for Cyber at Fort Gordon, GA, 
offered several areas where AI can aid EW and cyberspace capabilities. For instance, he 
stated the application of AI could help reduce the time needed for EW and cyberspace systems to 
reconfigure and change techniques (or tools) to enable and protect friendly forces’ access to 
EMS and information systems (IS) while denying adversaries access to the same. 
During the workshop, participants discussed what AI/ML is, its applicability to cyberspace 
and EW operations, and some of the challenges that must be addressed. In general, AI is a set 
of algorithmic approaches for improving the functionality and performance of a computational 
system. It reduces the workload of system operators, so they can focus on higher-level, cog-
nitive tasks.[13] In effect, the underlying so#ware is more intelligent and, reduces the number 
of low-level tasks that one must perform. For example, a voice recognition system reduces 
the amount of keyboard input. We can think of AI in terms of three overarching goals. 
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First, some AI emulates intelligent behavior. These systems attempt to act as a human would, 
regardless of whether the underlying sensing or computations are human-like. Driverless cars 
are a good example: the goal is to have these cars drive like a human would, or perhaps even 
better. Many times, little regard is given to the corresponding human analogy of the underly-
ing sensors (e.g., LIDAR vs. eyes) and computations (e.g., search algorithm vs. visual-spatial 
reasoning). A second goal is the emulation of intelligent thinking. For example, Amazon’s Alexa 
and Google’s Home receive human voice as an input, perceive the verbal question through an 
ML model, encode it into an internal knowledge representation, decide on an answer through 
knowledge search, and then encode and deliver an audio response. Finally, some AI goals are 
to surpass human performance. State of the art image recognition systems are now equaling, or 
in some cases, superseding human performance. A recent example is how DeepMind research-
ers recently defeated the Alpha Go world champion by training a deep reinforcement learning 
model to defeat itself and ultimately others through self-play.[14] 
Today, we see the beginning of ML as a signal modulation (e.g., APSK, PSK, QAM, etc.) clas-
sifier. Past approaches relied heavily on hand-engineered feature extractors for specific signal 
properties along with rigid decision boundaries. These knowledge-cra#ed detectors created 
oversimplifying assumptions, making it difficult to adapt to new signals or emitters. Recently, 
some have trained convolutional deep neural networks (DNNs) with raw in-phase-quadrature 
(I/Q) data to classify modulation schemes with results well over 80% for high signal-to-noise 
ratio (SNR)—above 10dB, delivering some promising results.[15] Still, these approaches for mod-
ulation classification are not without challenges. The current state-of-the-art is only useful at 
high SNR levels and with higher-order modulations being more difficult to classify at lower 
SNR. Moreover, the nature of DNN makes explainability and errors difficult to interpret, which 
affects trust. For instance, there is no set of features a DNN can offer an operator to explain why 
the classifier reached its decision. 
Participants identified three key challenges to employing AI/ML in EW/Cyber operational 
systems. The first is identifying and developing an infrastructure to support the research and 
development of these systems. This infrastructure includes the collection and storage of data 
for ML algorithms; the DevOps environment to support rapid prototyping and testing with this 
data and other developed models; and the experimentation ecosystem (simulated, emulated, 
and live) to support the development of operational concepts and to provide feedback to engi-
neers. To that end, the DoD’s Joint AI Center (JAIC) is working towards such a foundational in-
frastructure, albeit perhaps without a focused eye towards some of the implications discussed 
here for EW and cyberspace operations development. 
The second challenge, as with any AI/ML program, is that the data acquisition, inges-
tion, and curation (a.k.a. the data pipeline) becomes an increasingly important component 
in building reliable systems. This makes raising community awareness for collecting signal 
data during operations, exercises, and other activities having signals of interest paramount. 
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Preferably, data is being labeled as it is collected. O#en, it is not labeled, so the generation 
of synthetic data, where labeling can be easily controlled, becomes a default second strategy. 
Research must determine how to generate such cognitively plausible data streams with realistic, 
underlying physical signal characteristics. It must also simultaneously develop techniques to 
transfer learned AI/ML models, trained by synthetic data or real over-the-air (OTA) signals. 
Research is also needed to evaluate techniques to speed up learning, such as re-training the 
last few layers of a deep neural network or compensating for lack of data with generative 
adversarial networks.
Data and algorithm issues with sensors, storage, and compute locations must also be 
addressed given the disparity between the low bandwidth, high latency tactical edge and the 
cloud environment where most development and ML training occurs. For context, learning 
in AI may occur offline or online. Offline learning involves training the system, typically on 
millions of samples, outside of its operating environment before it is deployed to the production 
system (e.g., training a surveillance system with many images). Alternatively, online learn-
ing is when the AI system uses continuous data from its operating environment to refine its 
decision-making parameters. Participants recognized that online learning is important as 
military operations o#en occur in austere environments where connectivity to the “cloud” is 
intermittent at best. The ability for the system to learn online from both environmental cues 
and operator provided hints, requires other types of AI learning, such as reinforcement and 
episodic (i.e., analogy-based learning). This type of AI learning’s applicability to signal detec-
tion, characterization, and response is not as well studied as offline deep learning approaches.
The above two challenges involve some research but are primarily engineering challenges. 
The last challenge identified was more fundamental, as it involves the issue of trust between 
the human operator and the AI system. This challenge is brought up in many other military 
contexts when talking about the relationship between the human operator and their military 
tools, such as one’s rifle or tank, so we will not belabor the point here but rather point out some 
of the unique challenges with AI/ML systems. As mentioned above, the lack of transparency, 
or explainability, of non-symbolic ML approaches makes it difficult for human operators to 
understand how the underlying system inferred its classification. Without this understanding, 
it makes it more difficult for operators, especially experienced operators, to trust the system 
without a lot of training. Augmenting these non-symbolic approaches with references to symbolic, 
interpretable representations which make grounded explanations possible, is one approach to 
mitigate this shortcoming. 
Adversarial ML[6] is another issue that decreases trust in the AI/ML system if not properly 
addressed. In effect, adversarial ML is the ability to “spoof” an ML algorithm to classify a 
sample the way an adversary desires versus the way the model was trained. Through slight, 
unrecognizable perturbations in the input signal, adversarial ML takes advantage of the 
model’s classification boundaries, or manifolds, and the model misclassifies the sample. 
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Dr. Jacob H. Cox Jr., received his BSEE from Clemson University, SC in 2002, his 
MSECE from Duke University, NC in 2010, and his Ph.D. in ECE from Georgia Institute 
of Technology in 2017. As an Army officer with 21 years of active service 
(1996-2018), Jacob has served as a Cyber officer, a telecommunications engineer, 
and a signal officer. His assignments include company command at Fort Gordon, 
Georgia (2006-2008); Assistant Professor at the United States Military Academy 
(2010-2013), and Chief of Enterprise Operations at the South West Asia Cyber 
Center in Kuwait (2013-2014). Following his Army career, Jacob worked as a  
research scientist adapting artificial intelligence solutions to cyberspace  
operations, electronic warfare operations, and decision support. Jacob  
currently works as the lead data scientist at TCM Cyber, Fort Gordon, GA. 
Colonel Dan Bennett, Ph.D., joined the Army Cyber Institute in 2015. He is  
the Director of Research since serving a one-year operational experience  
(2016-2017) as the Technical Director Advisor to the Commander of the Cyber 
National Mission Force at Ft. Meade, MD where he led cyberspace operations 
infrastructure initiatives in particular. Col. Bennett came to the ACI from the 
Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS) at the U.S. 
Military Academy where he still teaches as an Associate Professor. Col. Bennett’s 
previous operational experiences include the lead network engineer for the 101st 
Airborne Division (Air Assault) which included 15 months as the Director of the 
Joint Network Operations and Security Center for Combined Joint Task Force – 101 
in Afghanistan. Col. Bennett has a Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering specializing in 
Communications and Digital Signal Processing.
Colonel (Ret.) Scott Lathrop, Ph.D., CISSP, is a visionary technology leader in AI, 
cybersecurity, and autonomous, unmanned systems. Dr. Lathrop retired from the 
United States Army, culminating his military career as the Director of Advanced 
Capability and Technology at the United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) 
where he led the command’s research and development efforts while serving as 
the chief scientist and technology officer for the Commander, United States Cyber 
Command/Director, National Security Agency. Prior to USCYBERCOM, Dr. Lathrop 
served as an Associate Professor in the Department of Electrical Engineering and 
Computer Science at the United States Military Academy (USMA) helping design 
and lead USMA’s initial cybersecurity and robotics programs. He is a distinguished 
graduate from West Point and holds a Ph.D. in Computer Science and Engineering 
from the University of Michigan and received the Army’s Draper Leadership Award 
as an Armored/Cavalry commander, led the development of some of the Army’s 
first cloud-based command and control analytic applications, and has been 
recognized for teaching and research excellence.
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This effect, coupled with the lack of explainability in how these inferences are made can quick-
ly erode trust if the operator suspects malplay. To help build trust, participants expressed the 
need to bound the behavior of the AI/ML system through interaction and the ability to express 
what the system’s high-level goal(s) and tasks are for the current operational mission—in much 
the same manner that one would direct a small unit or individual soldier. 
Finally, as to the application of AI to enhance EW and cyberspace capabilities, participants 
asked that leaders and researchers consider which systems and platforms in current use could 
benefit from autonomy. Participants noted that humans might place too high an expectation 
on autonomous systems to perform flawlessly and expect too much too soon. They noted that 
humans frequently fail to perform perfectly, yet autonomous systems seem to be held to a higher 
standard. These observations drove some interesting questions. First, what level of error thresh-
old are we willing to accept from systems working autonomously? Second, assuming we cannot 
account for all the system’s data in real-time when it makes an error, who gets blamed for the 
error when it occurs? These are challenges and ethical considerations for future discovery.
VII. LEVERAGING EW AND CYBER FOR IO 
US adversaries have already successfully leveraged the cyberspace domain to conduct 
information operation (IO) campaigns. Due to the restrictions on U.S. military operations from 
Title 10 (the role of the Armed Forces), Title 32 (National Guard) and Title 50 (National Defense) 
mandates, the flexibility and options used by our adversaries to gain advantage are not readily 
at the disposal of U.S. Forces. Given the nature of a cyberspace war that would place U.S. Forces 
in near constant competition with our adversaries, we must ask what that line of delineation 
between competition and conflict regarding the execution of Title 10, 50, and 32 operations is? 
Workshop participants observed that the line between competition and conflict is not easily de-
fined. Given that traditional military operations are addressed and executed through a phased 
approach, the planning and execution phases of EW/Cyber operations are difficult to pinpoint. 
The difficulty in identifying the phases of a war in cyberspace is further compounded when 
we attempt to apply traditional operational doctrine to the situation, specifically, the execution 
of IO in accordance with Joint Publication (JP 3-13). It characterizes IO as the integrated 
employment, during military operations, of Information Related Capabilities (IRC’s) in con-
cert with other lines of operations to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making 
of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. The phrase, “during military 
operations,” could be difficult to identify. JP 3-13 goes on to say that many military capabilities 
contribute to IO and should be taken into consideration during the planning process, 
including strategic communications, public affairs, civil-military operations, information 
assurance, space operations, military deception, joint electromagnetic spectrum operations, 
and cyberspace operations. In this description, cyberspace operations and information 
assurance are listed as distinct entities from electromagnetic spectrum operations. 
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Mr. Chris Walls is a retired Cyber Warfare Officer and is currently a Lead Cyber 
Security Engineer with the MITRE Corporation. He was commissioned as an 
Infantry Officer and served in both mechanized and airborne units with numerous 
combat deployments. In 2010, Chris began his cyber career at US Cyber Command 
and subsequently served operational and institutional assignments at Army Cyber 
Command, Army Cyber Center of Excellence, and in HQDA G/3/5/7 Cyber Directorate 
(DAMO-CY). Among his many distinguished accomplishments, he most recently 
led the development of Army Field Manual 3-12 Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare 
Operations, assisted in the design of the Army’s new Cyberspace and Electronic 
Warfare units, and is an acknowledged expert on full spectrum cyberspace  
operations within the Department of Defense. The author’s affiliation with The  
MITRE Corporation is provided for identification purposes only, and is not intended 
to convey or imply MITRE’s concurrence with, or support for, the positions, 
opinions, or viewpoints expressed by the author.. 
CW4 (RET) Jason LaClair, joined the Army in September of 1995 and attended 
Basic training at Fort Jackson, SC. He then reported to Advanced Individual 
Training in Pensacola, FL. Jason has been a career military intelligence (MI) 
Soldier with assignments including the National Security Agency, the Space and 
Missile Defense Command, the 4th Infantry Division, the National Reconnaissance 
Office and Army Cyber Command. He has been deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan 
and served temporary duty in Korea, India and New Zealand. Jason attended the 
Intermediate Signals Analysis Course, warrant officer Basic Course, warrant officer 
Advanced Course, Air Assault and Airborne School.  Jason’s awards include the 
Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star and the Commander’s Award for Civilian Service. 
Jason has a Bachelor of Science from the University of Alabama and is pursuing a 
Master of Public Administration from Penn State University. Jason currently works 
as a defense contractor and resides in Augusta, GA. 
Lieutenant Colonel Clint Tracy was commissioned from Texas A&M University  
as an Armor Officer and served in leadership positions in Armor Battalions from 
1998 to 2006. From 2006 to 2010 he was assigned to Operations Group, National 
Training Center, Fort Irwin, California and the Canadian Maneuver Training 
Center where he served in observer controller positions providing feedback to 
units preparing for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. In 2011 he 
attended CGSC and simultaneously earned a M.S. in IT Management. From 2012 to 
2016 he served as the G35 1st Infantry Division, a Cavalry Squadron XO, Brigade 
S3, Brigade Deputy Commander, Provisional Brigade Commander, and the Theater 
Army Branch Chief for TCM EAB. In 2017 he transitioned to Electronic Warfare and 
is currently the CEMA Chief for the 1st Cavalry Division where he integrates Cyber 
and Electronic Warfare into tactical operations. LTC Tracy has combat experience 
in Iraq and Afghanistan.
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The mission of ARCYBER is to “conduct full-spectrum cyberspace operations, electronic warfare 
and information operations, ensuring freedom of action for friendly forces in and through the 
cyber domain and the information environment, while denying the same to our adversaries.” 
One could argue the mission of ARCYBER is, in part, to conduct IO. Already, ARCYBER is in 
the process of categorizing many of the separate operations above (EW, IO, and cyberspace 
operations) under the umbrella of “information warfare.” The term “Information Warfare” is 
not yet defined in our doctrine; however, the initiative stems from NDAA Sections: 1637 - In-
tegration of Strategic Information Operations and Cyber-Enabled Information Operations; and 
1641 - Plan to Increase Cyber and Information Operations, Deterrence, and Defense to Develop 
a “Strategic Framework for the conduct of DoD IO.” However, according to BG Angle, the role 
of the ARCYBER Commander may be short-lived, becoming a subset of IO, while the name of 
ARCYBER could soon become something close to Information Warfare Operations Command.
Recognizing this, a closer look at how and when IO planning occurs is in order. JP 3-13 is 
clear, “IO planning begins at the earliest stages of [the] Joint Operations Planning Process 
(JOPP) and must be an integral part of, not an addition to, the overall planning efforts. IRCs can 
be used in all phases of a campaign or operation, but their effective employment during the 
shape and deter phases can have a significant impact on remaining phases.” When do these 
“shape and deter” phases begin and end? The conduct of IO must have an appreciation for the 
inter-related capabilities of cyberspace operations, (both defensive and offensive), EW, and sig-
nals intelligence—most importantly for assessing the effectiveness of IO. Due to the length of 
time needed to identify, develop, and deploy cyberspace operations tools, waiting until phase 
0 to begin the process (especially the process of collection management from an intelligence 
perspective) will likely not deliver the desired effects when needed. Perhaps no kinetic opera-
tion is warranted if a shape and deter IO campaign is effective in quelling any conflict before 
it begins.
The Army, specifically the Program Executive Office for Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and 
Sensors (PEO-IEWS), views Information Warfare as the complementary components of intel-
ligence, cyberspace operations, EW, and signal. Each of these elements is a potential tool for 
conducting Information Warfare. With that, the acquisitions process is being adjusted to meet 
the needs of warfighters with more agile acquisition processes and best-of-breed application of 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) and government-off-the-shelf (GOTS) capabilities. One expects 
the doctrine to evolve with the capabilities. Cyberspace operations and capabilities will also 
impact the Commanders’ decisions in the arena of “intelligence gain/loss” like never before. 
New questions will seek to determine whether the delivery of content in an IO campaign will 
rival the Commander’s ability to disable an adversaries’ communications network? These are 
challenges that U.S. commanders have not faced on linear battlefields in the past, but emerging 
technology is bringing enhanced cyberspace and EW operations to the forefront.
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Cyber is inherently a joint operation. Just as the Navy has re-badged numerous elements 
within their formations to present a better-defined mission focus, and consolidate talent and re-
sources, so too shall the Army. Challenges facing the Army will be which flags are to be furled 
and which are to be flown. As the Army decided between intelligence and signal to give birth 
to a cyber element, similar decisions now must be made about acquisitions, requirements, 
training, and doctrine supporting elements. Training must be the most pressing item. Is this a 
maneuver effort, an intelligence function, or a cyberspace operation? A kinetic or non-kinetic 
fight? Is the Information Officer on staff equipped to take on such a task? Cyber Intelligence is 
not a recognized category, but the operational information gleaned from cyberspace operations 
certainly carries intelligence value. How is the relationship between the staff intelligence offi-
cer, operations officer, and signal/communications officer meeting the commander’s require-
ments to protect his or her network while potentially exploiting or denying the adversary use of 
their own? Cyber Electromagnetic Activities cells (see FM 3-38) are operational elements at the 
Division level, but the IO campaigns from which they feed and obtain information will likely be 
conducted at the theater level.
The categorization of IO as a kinetic or non-kinetic capability is not a simple task. If, when 
learning that an adversary has disabled a Bradley via a cyberspace operation (a phase 0 activ-
ity) in an information warfare campaign and the crew then abandons that Bradley, the vehicle 
is effectively destroyed, similar to a kinetic effect. Adversely, if counter-cyberspace operations 
(defense) are effective in keeping the adversary from disabling the Bradley vehicle, it can deal 
a blow to the adversary’s battle plan, both kinetically and from an information warfare per-
spective. Then, how useful can efforts before phase 0 of an operation to obtain the information 
needed to access networks, impact social media users, degrade GPS, or disrupt communica-
tions? The simple demonstration or application of these capabilities may negate the need for 
CW4 Judy Esquibel is an active duty Cyber Operations Technician. She is  
currently assigned as an Information Sciences Ph.D. student, at the Naval  
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. Formerly, she served at the Army Cyber 
Institute (ACI) and as an Instructor within the Electric Engineering and Computer 
Science Department, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY. Her research efforts 
at the ACI focused on improving critical infrastructure protection, public-private 
partnerships and cyber exercises. Some of her results and conclusions were  
codified in the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2019 to enhance the nation’s critical infrastructure security. Her operational  
experience includes 20 years of Signals Intelligence and Cyber operational  
assignments, which include being assigned on a Combat Mission Team,  
within the Cyber Mission Forces, U.S. Cyber Command.  
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further escalation. Perhaps these efforts could be the decisive actions during phase I, II, III or 
beyond in the Operation Plan (OPLAN), but they would not be available if the planning phase 
was not enacted until phase 0. Part of the challenge will be proving that the desired effects can 
be met via cyberspace operations where kinetic effects have traditionally persevered. Combat-
ant Commanders trust visuals of smoking craters more than percentages (or probabilities) of 
success based on mathematical equations. This will require the inclusion of new, modular, and 
data-driven battle damage assessment (BDA) tools for IO. 
In closing, leveraging cyberspace and EW operations to facilitate IO opens a wide spectrum 
of possibilities to warfighters, potentially winning wars before they are fought. Already, EW is 
listed as one of the five core capabilities of IO.[17] At a minimum, conducting IO at the earliest 
possible opportunity will give Commanders an advantage during subsequent phases of the 
battle. However, the correct characterization and application of IO are required. The manning, 
training and equipping of those expected to execute IO also deserves appreciation and atten-
tion by commanders and given a priority of effort. 
VIII. CONCLUSION
As near-peer adversaries continue to develop and employ increasingly advanced technolo-
gies in multi-domain battle, the US is challenged to hone its EW and cyberspace operations into 
carefully integrated capabilities. Naturally, the merger of EW and Cyber comes with challenges, 
friction points, and gaps that must be overcome for U.S. Forces to thrive in multi-domain battle. 
The EWC2 workshop identified multiple challenges and opportunities where these issues can 
be addressed. As such, this work merely offers questions and leaves the real work to other 
researchers, policymakers, and leaders to answer. Additionally, while the EWC2 workshop’s 
focus began with the convergence of EW and Cyber, it is apparent that even these may only be 
part of the larger whole. In the future, other components, such as IO, Psychological Operations, 
Intel, Space, and Signal, may soon join the merger. 
Participants also discovered that the Army is already conducting a study to ascertain how 
all of these groups might fit under the umbrella of Information Warfare Operations. Perhaps a 
circus tent would be apropos considering how these disparate disciplines must learn to com-
plement one another. Regardless of terminology, the concepts behind Information Warfare Op-
erations must be further refined. To accomplish this feat and dominate future conflicts, the 
U.S. and its allies must work together to address friction, close gaps, and embrace evolving 
technologies within EW and cyberspace operations, incorporating other disciplines where it 
makes sense. With near-peer adversaries investing in EW and cyberspace operations, rapidly 
building and employing their capabilities, the U.S. must aggressively tackle these challenges 
or face a future conflict where information superiority is not achieved. 
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